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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ABOLITION OF THE CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
NOTE IN RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES
CONTRACTS IN PENNSYLVANIA*
INTRODUCTION
Confession of judgment is "the act of a debtor in permitting
judgment to be entered against him by his creditor, for a stipulated
sum, by a written statement to that effect or by warrant of attor-
ney, without the institution of legal proceedings of any kind."1
Although it has been nearly universally held that there is no
difference in legal efficacy between a judgment entered by con-
fession and a judgment based upon a jury verdict,2 it is obvious
that the former is summary in nature and not the product of an
adjudication." While thirty-three American jurisdictions provide
for confession of judgment 4 in some form, Pennsylvania is one of
only three states5 which permit the use of judgment notes. The
statutory authority for the use of judgment notes in Pennsylvania
provides:
It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court
of record, within this commonwealth, on the application of
any person, being the original holder (or assignee of such
holder) of a note, bond or other instrument of writing, in
which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for
an attorney at law, or other person, to confess judgment, to
enter judgment against the person or persons who executed
the same, for the amount which from the face of the instru-
ment may appear to be due, without the agency of an
attorney, or declaration filed, with such stay of execution
as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of one dollar, to
be paid by the defendant; particularly entering on his
docket the date and tenor of the instrument in writing on
which the judgment may be founded, which shall have the
same force and effect as if a declaration had been filed,
and judgment confessed by an attorney, or judgment ob-
tained in open court and in term time ....
* This paper was originally prepared for the Legislative Research
Committee, an extra-curricular student research group at the law school
assisting members of the General Assembly in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
1. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 978 (4th ed. 1951).
2. O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 12 A.2d 830 (1940).
3. Bredin's Appeal, 92 Pa. 241, 247, 248 (1879).
4. For complete list of jurisdictions providing for confession of judg-
ment, see Appendix infra.
5. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(4) (Smith-Hurd 1961) and OHIo
REV. CoDE ANN. § 2323.13 (Baldwin 1953); for Pennsylvania statute; see
note 6 infra.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 739 (1953).
In an era when consumer protection pervades the law of sales
of goods through express and implied warranties,7 quality control
procedures, etc., the use of the judgment note may represent the
most objectionable practice in consumer credit. It operates to the
advantage of the fraudulent seller at the expense of the unwary
low-income purchaser who is forced to rely upon installment buy-
ing for most of his purchases.
The judgment note usually operates in the following fashion.
The consumer will purchase on credit an item of furniture for his
home. In so doing he must sign an authorization of entry of con-
fession of judgment at the time he makes his purchase. In obtain-
ing the buyer's signature on the judgment note, the seller gains a
dual advantage. First, invariably the low-income consumer is com-
pletely uninformed concerning the nature and consequences of his
signing such an instrument at the time of the sale. Second, if the
consumer discovers that the chattel is defective, his immediate
reaction is to discontinue payment of further installments under
the conditional sales contract. Such a decision on the part of the
purchaser frequently leads to his financial ruination. For, as de-
scribed by Philadelphia's former District Attorney, James C. Crum-
lish at the Donolow Committee Hearings: ". . . before he knows
it, there has been an execution on the note and his house is about
to be sold from under him."8
Such an occurrence is not uncommon, because in addition to
his signing the judgment note, the unwary buyer will sign simul-
taneously an express waiver of his $300 personal exemption,
thereby leaving him at the mercy of his seller-creditor. Further,
should the buyer reconsider and attempt to preserve his real estate
or household furnishings after being delinquent on a single pay-
ment, "he would have had to pay the entire unpaid balance, an
'attorney's fee' of 10% of the balance, and a 'late charge' of 5%."1o
AN ADHESION AREA
The most striking feature of this mercantile practice in Penn-
sylvania is the complete unavailability of a viable alternative to
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-312-2-318 (1962).
8. May 10, 1962, at 145, as quoted in Translating Sympathy For De-
ceived Consumers Into Effective Programs For Protection, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 395, 418 (1965).
9. In lieu of the property now exempt by law from levy and sale on
execution, issued upon any judgment obtained upon contract and distress
for rent, property to the value of three hundred dollars, exclusive of all
wearing apparel of the defendant and his family, and all bibles and school
books in use in the family (which shall remain exempted as heretofore),
and no more, owned by or in possession of any debtor, shall be exempt
from levy and sale on execution or by distress for rent. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2161 (1967).
10. Translating Sympathy For Deceived Consumers Into Effective Pro-
grams For Protection, supra.
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the judgment note for the low, marginal and middle income con-
sumer. It is these individuals who are the least susceptible to
interim collection methods and most apt to be the subject of legal
process. 54.2% of default judgments are attributable to marginal
and submarginal income, while 80% are in the broader sub-median
income group.1 ' In a survey conducted among families who re-
ported that they had been defrauded, the following reactions were
recorded:
(1) 50% reported that they did nothing.
(2) 40% attempted to deal with the merchants themselves.
(3) Only 10% sought professional help. 12
These enumerated income groups simply cannot afford to pay cash;
therefore credit is indispensable.
Since the consumer must finance his transaction, he can only
bargain upon the terms which a merchant offers to him. Professor
Enrenzweig has defined "adhesion" as "agreements in which one
party's participation consists in his mere 'adherence' often unwill-
ing and often, unknowing, to a document drafted unilaterally and
insisted upon by what is usually a powerful enterprise."'8 Thus, a
consumer who wishes to purchase on credit will have to sign a
judgment note and, in addition, he may have to expressly waive
his statutory $300 exemption. In such a case, it certainly cannot be
argued that the respective bargaining positions of buyer and seller
approach equality.
UNCONSCIONABILITY
It appears that in many, if not all, instances the use of the
judgment note flies directly into the face of Uniform Commercial
Code Section 2-302, which prohibits an unconscionable contract or
clause. Pursuant to section 2-302 of the U.C.C., if the court as a
matter of law finds the contract, or any clause of the contract, to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made, it can exercise
any of three alternatives. First, if the contract is permeated by
unconscionability the court may refuse to enforce the contract as a
whole. Second, the court may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause. Finally, a court may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause in order to avoid
any unconscionable result. It should be noted that Comment 1 to
11. Resort to Legal Process in Collecting Debts; Alternative Methods
for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 879, 896 (1967).
12. Id. at 900.
13. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 1072, 1075 (1953).
section 2-302 prevents invoking the protection of that section if the
provision in question is merely the result of the seller's superior
bargaining power; however, he may seek its protection in order to
prevent oppression and unfair surprise. 4
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing discussion outlines possible judicial courses of
action in limiting the unconscionable effects of the judgment note.
But it appears that, except for a ruling of unconstitutionality, the
hands of the judiciary are tied by the Act authorizing the use of
the judgment note.'5
Not only does this commercial modus operandi fail to provide
the consumer with notice, but it also deprives him of an opportu-
nity to raise defenses before the judgment is executed. The lack
of notice in judgments by confession may in the near future render
such notes unconstitutional as failing to comply with the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion.'" The State's financial concerns who defend and perpetuate
the elimination of notice, contend that such notice is wholly un-
necessary since the defendant has already consented to such
waiver.17 Such reasoning however, overlooks the adhesive nature
of the Pennsylvania judgment note. Thus, while it has been repeat-
edly held that the defendant's signature upon the judgment note
constitutes consent to waiver of notice, such "consent" is fictitious
since the low income consumer understands neither the character
nor possible ramifications of the note.
Similarly, the proponents of the judgment note insist that its
unassailed one hundred sixty-two year existence attests to its being
not only constitutional but also essential in commercial financing.
However, consumers obtain credit and purchase on the installment
method in large, predominantly commercial states which have con-
tinued to function effectively after abolishing confession of judg-
ment in any form. 8 This greatly detracts from the "commercial
necessity" contention. Also, longevity can, by no means, be
equated with constitutionality. If such were the case, the doctrine
of "separate, but equal" as enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson'9
14. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
15. Act of February 24, 1806, P.L. 334, 4 Sm. L. 270 § 28, as amended,
12 P.S. 739.
16. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Interview with Finance Company Manager.
18. See, e.g., CAL. COMM. CODE § 1804.1 (1964); MI. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§ 130(b) (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17: 16C-37 (1963); N.Y. PERS. PROP.
LAW § 403(3) (c) (1962).
19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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would still represent the law. However, nearly sixty years after
its initial pronouncement, the doctrine was struck down as in-
herently unfair. 20 Today few, if any, would contest the statement
that "separate. . .facilities are inherently unequal.
' '21
If a nation remains insensitive to the needs of a large segment
of its populace for over a century, then a state may be excused for
myopic inaction when change is warranted and essential. Such
change must certainly be effected, preferably by the legislature
since the judgment note is a creature of statute. However, if the
legislature's reluctance to act produces a test case, the concern of
the United States Supreme Court for the protection of the rights of
the individual, particularly the underprivileged individual, may
cause it to declare the enforcement of such notes without notice
unconstitutional. 22 The Court should rule such notes unconstitu-
tional because a default in the payment of a note places upon the
defendant the financial onus of opening judgment without the
benefit of timely notice and, in many cases, without the opportunity
of asserting defenses. With the exception of particular bailment
situations21 and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,24 the plaintiff must
sustain his burden of proof in a civil court. Yet, Pennsylvania
20. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Id. at 495.
22. Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 909 (1960).
23. [I]n many cases it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the
bailor to prove lack of care on the part of the bailee. The bailee
simply fails to return the goods on demand. The reason for such
failure is ordinarily not known to the bailor but only to the
bailee. To require the bailor to prove that the failure to return
was due to the negligence of the bailee might impose on him a
task impossible of accomplishment, and effectually deny recovery
altogether.
In situations of this character, the law has not been unmindful
of the plaintiff's predicament and has acted to assist him in several
ways. It may shift to the defendant the burden of presenting
the evidence as to the specific cause of the plaintiff's loss damage.
It may go further and, instead of requiring the plaintiff to convince
the jury or other trier of the facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant was negligent, may require the defendant
to prove in like manner that he was not negligent.
BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 87 (1955).
24. In order for the court to apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur,
three conditions must exist: (1) the event must be of a kind which ordi-
narily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must
be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Kunzie v. Leeds, 66 Ohio App. 469,
34 N.E.2d 448 (1941); Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d
623 (1955); Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50 Cal. App. 2d 153, 323 P.2d
391 (1958); Mitchom v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 182, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959).
PROSSER, TORTS § 39 (3d ed. 1964).
has insisted that the defendant-debtor show cause for the opening
of judgment in an adhesion contract. It is submitted that, in the
area of the judgment note, expediency should yield to due process
considerations; if this commercial practice is to be continued, the
financing industry must justify its raison d' etre.
JUDGMENT NOTE IN PRACTICE
More often than not, the note has been renegotiated to a holder
in due course, against whom only the real defenses enumerated in
U.C.C. section 3-305(2) are availing.2 5 If the consumer-maker pos-
sesses only a personal defense, it will be unavailing against a person
who has taken the note for value, in good faith, and without notice
that it is overdue or of any defense on the part of any person.
28
However,
even if defenses are available and there is truth to a fi-
nance company attorney's statement that after execution
'anyone with any type of defense could open a judgment,'
most people would certainly be unwilling (if not com-
pletely incapable) to pay approximately $300 to unravel
something which should have been straightened out in the
first instance when the complaint was made.2 7
The final impediment to the buyer-maker's petition to open
judgment is the prohibitive cost of such proceedings. While several
county bar associations have established the minimum fee for open-
ing a judgment at $150,28 it has been estimated that the average fee
charged for handling such a case in Philadelphia is in excess of
$300.29 Obviously, a consumer who does not have the financial
means to make installment payments on the purchased article, will
not be able to initiate proceedings to open judgment.
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (1962).
Rights of a Holder in Due Course:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the
instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple con-
tract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign
the instrument with neither knowledge of its character or
its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he takes the instrument.
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(1) (1962).
27. Testimony of former Philadelphia District Attorney James C.
Crumlish, Jr. at the Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962 at 145.
28. See, e.g., Erie Bar Association Minimum Fee Bill, adopted April 1,
1967, p. 13. Philadelphia Bar Association Minimum Fee Bill, adopted De-
cember 29, 1964, p. 28.
29. Testimony of James C. Crumlish, Jr. at the Donolow Committee
Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 145.
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Even where a consumer-maker is financially able to petition
to open judgment, such proceedings are both costly and time con-
suming to the petitioner. Here the petitioning consumer, in con-
trast to nearly all other areas of American law, must sustain the
burden of proof. Two relatively recent Pennsylvania cases illus-
trate the undue advantage which the judgment note affords the
unscrupulous seller against the unsuspecting buyer. In Imperial
Consumer Service, Inc. v. Walton 30 the defendant-buyer purchased
a swimming pool from the plaintiff company. During the contract
negotiations, defendants alleged that a salesman of the company
had practiced fraud upon them by reassuring them that no judg-
ment note was being signed. Also the defendant-husband involved
was suffering with cataracts of the eyes, necessitating the signing
of his name with the aid of a magnifying glass. In this case, the
defendants were obviously allowed into defense, but not until they
had overcome the plaintiff's tactical advantage afforded by the
judgment note.
A similar case is Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gardiner3' in which the
defendant-buyer entered a contract for the covering of his home
with aluminum siding with a company, which was prima facie
engaged in work of this type. The defendants alleged that a sales-
man who posed as an agent for the company with whom they
believed they were dealing, fraudulently induced them to sign a
judgment note by means of false representations. Again, the de-
fendants were let into a defense, but not before it was determined
that the note was non-negotiable ab initio,2 that the defendant-
makers had only an eighth grade education and were inexperienced
in business affairs, and that alleged fraud had been perpetrated
upon the defendant-makers.
These cases and others of similar result, 3 illustrate the tactical
benefit which the judgment note affords the fraudulent seller in
his attempt to deceive the often aged, uneducated, afflicted or
commercially unsophisticated buyer.
30. 78 Montg. Co. L. R. 37; Del Duca, Commercial Code Reporter,
3-305(2)-l (1960).
31. 191 Pa. Super. 17, 155 A.2d 405 (1959).
32. Since the note authorized the power to confess judgment at any
time, it was properly ruled non-negotiable, as being contrary to the pro-
visions of U.C.C. § 3-112[l] [d].
33. See Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Mullaney, 187 Pa. Super. 190,
144 A.2d 438 (1958); and Century Appliance Co. v. Groff, 56 Lanc. Rev.
67a (1958).
MODEL AND PENDING LEGISLATION
These extreme inequities prompted the framers of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code to propound the following provision:
Confession of Judgment
A debtor may not give a power of attorney to any
person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of a
consumer loan. A power of attorney given in violation of
this section is void.3
4
Such provision also finds support in seventeen states, including
California, Connecticut, 5 Maryland, New Jersey and New York,
which have outlawed all forms of confession of judgment in their
respective retail sales acts. 6
The Pennsylvania legislature as well as the Civil Procedure
Rules Committee should also be cognizant of congressional concern
for consumer protection as evidenced by pending legislation en-
titled the Consumer Credit Protection Act.87 This bill provides,
inter alia, for full disclosure of the terms and conditions of finance
charges in credit transactions or in offers to extend credit, as well
as including restrictions upon the amount of the consumer's salary
which may be garnished. This latter practice of garnishing the
consumer's salary without informing him of the limits to which
such garnishment can be practiced is "frequently an essential ele-
ment in predatory extensions of credit."8 8 Thus, several state legis-
latures and Congress have realized the importance of eliminating
deceptive consumer practices, of which the judgment note is one
of the most blatant and potentially the most fraudulent.
Recently, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Goods and
Services Installment Sales Act39 in an attempt to enlighten and
protect the oft-deceived consumer. This Act encompasses trans-
actions which are not within the scope of the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act 40 or the Home Improvement Finance Act.41 Among
the more important features of the 1966 Installment Sales Act are
the following provisions:
(1) use of prescribed minimum sized print;
(2) use of bold-face print to call buyer's attention to
salient features of the written agreement;
(3) regulation of the extent to which service charges may
be assessed on installment sales contracts;
(4) date disclosure; and
(5) a provision for negotiability and assignment: No con-
34. Working Draft No. 6, § 3.407, adopted December 4, 1967 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 42-88 (1962).
36. See note 18 supra.
37. Working Draft H.R. 11601 Consumer Credit Protection Act, p. 15.
38. Id.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (1966).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (1965).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 500-101 (1966).
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tract or obligation shall contain any provision by
which buyer agrees not to assert a claim or defense
arising out of the sale against an assignee unless given
notice of assignment to buyer and within forty-five
days of notice, receives no return notice of defenses.
Such legislation is consistent with the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act 42 now pending in Congress. However, there is nothing
comparable on the federal level to the judgment note which would
dilute the effect of the federal legislation. But for any comparable
legislation in Pennsylvania to be effective, the judgment note must
be either abolished or its effect upon the consumer should be
drastically reduced.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES
Except for Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois, the jurisdictions
which provide for confession of judgment refuse to recognize the
use of the judgment note. The states refusing to recognize judg-
ment notes provide for confession of judgment in one of two ways.
First, a debtor may sign an office confession of judgment in the
clerk's office of the local court.43 The statement is a prepared one
to which the debtor must subscribe his name. Michigan has a sim-
ilar, though less formalized provision, which specifies that if the
debtor is to confess judgment at all, it must be confessed in a
separate instrument.44 The second alternative provides for con-
fession of judgment in open court with the proper jurisdiction.
45
Each alternative is highly preferable to the use of the judgment
note, since each involves an independent, volitional act on the part
of the debtor acknowledging his indebtedness in the presence and
protection of an officer of the law.
The elementary, but often overlooked, rules of commercial fair
play and constitutional due process demand the abolition of the
one hundred sixty-two year old judgment note in Pennsylvania.
But the state's financial concerns vigorously support the status quo.
It is claimed by the state's business interests that it saves attorney's
fees since there are no complaints to file, no defenses to defeat and
little probability that a court might decide that the money is not
owing. But the argument that the judgment note is a "necessary
expedient" is completely unavailing. While it is claimed that the
procedure spares the cost of an attorney, the defendant must invar-
iably incur the expense of counsel to open judgment; and it is the
42. Working Draft H.R. 11601, supra note 36.
43. MISS. CODE ANN., § 1551 (1956).
44. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. tit. 27A, § 2906 (1967).
45. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 301 (1962).
defendant-buyer who can least afford to bear such cost. Therefore,
the practice represents an expedient only to the business commun-
ity, which thus far has been able to maintain the anachronism via a
vocal, well-organized lobby.
Unfortunately, while the consumer is one of society's largest
interest group, it, regrettably, has no lobby. While the Legal Aid
Services located within the State have helped to reduce the low-
income consumer's burden in petitioning to open judgment, such
services simply do not reach sufficient numbers of consumers to
operate as a viable alternative to abolition of the judgment note.
PROPOSED RULE REVISIONS
The Civil Procedure Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has recently proposed revisions in the rules for con-
fession of judgments. 4 6 Substantial changes have been suggested
with regard to the collection of attorney's fees in confessions by
the prothonotary under the Act of 1806. If the proposed rule were
adopted, it would no longer be permissible for the prothonotary in
confessing judgment under Rule 2951(a) to include attorneys' fees
in the judgment itself. This proposal was prompted by the con-
cern of some prothonotaries over their power to confess a judgment
for more than the face amount of the note if the addition of either
interest or attorneys' fees had this result. The proposed rule now
makes it clear that this will be permissible, but only as to the
addition of interest calculable from the face of the instrument.47
Similarly Rule 2958, providing for notice to the debtor which
cannot be waived and Rule 2960 which streamlines the proceedings
of the opening of judgment have been proposed for the consumers'
protection.4 While these rules are directed at aiding the debtor,
they do not reach the core of the problem. The objectionable
features of the confession of judgment are its failure to invoke the
legal process, the unavailability of a viable alternative and the
oppression, whether potential or actual, of the commercially un-
wary. Such abuses can be remedied only by abolition of the con-
fession of judgment or by confessing judgment by a separate voli-
tional act.
CONCLUSION
In the light of the unnecessary litigation, the inherent coercion,
and the gross unfairness to the unwary consumer which directly
result from the judgment note, and in view of the overwhelming
trend in the direction of consumer protection, the Pennsylvania
legislature should join its sister states of New York, New Jersey
and Maryland in abolishing the judgment note in retail installment
sales contracts.
GERALD E. BLOOM
46. The Legal Intelligencer, July, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
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